

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA  
HAMMOND DIVISION

DANIELLE MONTAGUE-BEY and  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
REPUBLIC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CAUSE NO. 2:25-CV-279-PPS-AZ

STATE OF INDIANA, LAKE COUNTY  
SUPERIOR COURT, JUDGE JULIE N.  
CANTRELL, JUDICIAL OFFICER  
BOLING, and MAGISTRATE ROBERT  
JEFFREY,

Defendants.

**OPINION AND ORDER**

Danielle Montague Bey and the “United States of America Republic”, without counsel, seek reconsideration of the Court’s July 17, 2025, Order [DE 5] that denied their request to remove a pending state criminal case to federal court. In that Order, I concluded I lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and remanded the case to state court. Plaintiffs present no error or basis for reconsideration, so their motion is denied.

For starters, Plaintiffs provide no legal basis or standard for consideration of their motion. Given that the Court remanded Montague Bey’s criminal case to state court for lack of jurisdiction, this Court would appear to lack jurisdiction to review Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. The statute governing the procedure for removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), says “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was

removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” Because I concluded this Court lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance, it follows that I would lack jurisdiction to rule on this motion because the case has been remanded to state court. *See Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.*, 326 F.3d 828, 832–34 (7th Cir. 2003); *Peterson v. Lambert*, Cause No. 3:07-CV-016 TS, 2007 WL 837255 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2007). But given Plaintiffs cite of 28 U.S.C. § 1443 as their basis for removal, which is carved out as an exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), I will consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion.

Plaintiffs claim the Court erred in its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) as a vehicle for removal. They fail to address, however, why the Court’s holding that they failed to demonstrate they seek removal under a law “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality” is incorrect. *See Georgia v. Rachel*, 384 U.S. 780, 792, 800 (1966). Instead of alleging an error in the Court’s analysis on this point, Plaintiffs reiterate their same failed arguments. Plaintiffs’ reliance on an 1836 U.S. treaty with the Kingdom of Morrocco, the 1880 Treaty of Madrid, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act all plainly do not provide for civil rights in terms of racial equality.

Plaintiffs also ignore the Court’s prior ruling that the United States of America Republic, now styled as the United States of America Republic National Government, is not a proper party in this suit. Danielle Montague Bey may not represent the United States of America Republic in her *pro se* capacity. *Pro se* parties, such as Montague Bey, may only represent themselves; they cannot bring suit on behalf of others. *Nocula v.*

*UGS Corp.*, 520 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 2008); *People of the U.S. of Am. Republic v. City of Chi.*, CAUSE NO. 2:20-CV-373-PPS-JEM, 2020 WL 6502385, at \*2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 4, 2020) (holding “Christopher: Cannon-Bey, a non-lawyer” could not represent the “People of the United States of America Republic”). This dooms Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of the United States of America Republic under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International Organizations Immunities Act.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, Emergency Stay, Supplemental Judicial Notice, and Expanded Grounds [DE 6] is **DENIED**.

**SO ORDERED.**

ENTERED: September 3, 2025.

/s/Philip P. Simon  
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT